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COPYING IN PATENT LAW· 
CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA •• AND MARK A. LEMLEY ... 
Patent law is virtually alone in intellectual property (IP) in 
punishing independent development. To infringe a copyright or 
trade secret, defendants must copy the protected IP from the 
plaintiff, directly or indirectly. But patent infringement requires 
only that the defendant's product falls within the scope of the 
patent claims. Not only doesn't the defendant need to intend to 
infringe, but the defendant may be entirely unaware of the patent 
or the patentee and still face liability. 
Nonetheless, copying does play a role in some subsidiary patent 
doctrines, including damages rules, willfulness, and obviousness. 
More significantly, the rhetoric of patent law (and of IP law 
more generally) often seems to presuppose that defendants in 
patent cases are in fact engaged in copying. Similarly, the 
outcome of public policy debates over patent reform may well 
turn on the perception of patent infringers as either bad actors or 
as innocent businesspeople who accidentally ran afoul of a 
patent. 
Unfortunately, no one seems to know whether patent 
infringement defendants are in fact unscrupulous copyists or 
independent developers. In this paper, we seek to answer that 
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question. We look both at the allegations made in a random 
sample of complaints and at the treatment of copying in recent 
reported decisions, including willfulness decisions. We find that 
a surprisingly small percentage of patent cases involve even 
allegations of copying, much less proof of copying. Copying in 
patent law seems to be very much the exception, not the rule, 
except in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent law is virtually alone in intellectual property ("IP") law in 
punishing independent development. To infringe a copyright or trade 
secret, defendants must copy the protected IP from the plaintiff, 
directly or indirectly.1 But patent infringement requires only that the 
defendant's product falls within the scope of the patent claims. It's 
not just that patent law doesn't require any intent to infringe. The 
defendant may be entirely unaware of the patent or the patentee and 
still face liability for independently creating a similar work. 
Nonetheless, copying does play a role in some subsidiary patent 
doctrines, as we discuss in Part I. For example, the question of 
whether patent damages should be set in order to deter infringement, 
rather than solely to compensate the patentee, depends critically on 
whether infringers are in fact aware they are infringing, or at least 
that they are using the plaintiff's technology. The definition of 
"willful infringement" turns on the question of culpability, at least in 
the popular understanding of that term. Copying-or at least intent 
to infringe-is also an element of claims for indirect infringement.2 
More significantly, the rhetoric of patent law (and of IP law more 
generally) often seems to presuppose that defendants in patent cases 
are in fact engaged in copying. Similarly, the outcome of public 
policy debates over patent reform may well turn on the perception of 
patent infringers as either bad actors or as innocent businesspeople 
who accidentally ran afoul of a patent. 
Unfortunately, no one seems to know whether most patent 
infringement defendants are in fact unscrupulous copyists or 
independent developers. In this Article, we seek to shed light on that 
question. Because copying is not an element of any patent cause of 
action, courts do not normally make explicit findings as to whether 
defendants have copied. Instead, we turn in Part II to a variety of 
1. The Copyright Act defines the rights as ones involving a "copy" of a protected 
work, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), and courts are unanimous in requiring proof of copying, 
though that copying need not be intentional or even conscious. See ROBERT P. MERGES 
ET AL., lNTELLECfUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 476-82 (rev. 4th 
ed. 2007). Similarly, trade secret law requires that the secret be acquired from the 
plaintiff, and makes independent development a defense. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr 
§ 1, cmt. 1, 14 U.L.A. 529, 538 (2000) ("Proper means include ... [d]iscovery by 
independent invention."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). 
For our definition of copying, see infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (detailing copying's relevance in a 
claim of indirect infringement). 
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proxies to try to identify the subset of cases in which copying is 
alleged or proven. We look both at the allegations made in a random 
sample of complaints and at the treatment of copying in recent 
reported decisions. 
We find that a surprisingly small percentage of patent cases 
involve even allegations of copying, much less proof of copying. Only 
10.9% of the complaints studied-21 of 193 complaints--contained 
even an allegation that the defendant copied the invention, either 
from the patent or from the plaintiff's commercial product. This 
percentage is even lower when looking at published decisions, with 
6.89% of the decisions-129 of 1871 cases-including an allegation of 
copying. Copying was found in 33 of these cases, meaning that 
copying was established in only 1.76% of all cases in our dataset. 
Copying seems to be the exception, not the rule in patent cases. And 
our data indicates that copying is particularly rare outside of the 
pharmaceutical and chemical arts. Pharmaceutical and chemical cases 
constitute more than half of the allegations of copying in both 
complaints and decisions and two-thirds of the reported findings of 
copying. In other industries, such as computers and software, less 
than 3% of cases involve allegations of copying, and less than 1% 
involve proof of copying. 
Our findings have significant implications for both patent theory 
(which often depends on assumptions about the role of patent 
disclosure and improvements) and patent policy. In particular, we 
caution against the modern trend of treating infringers as bad actors 
when assessing damages; overwhelmingly, they are not. We discuss 
these and other implications in Part III. 
I. COPYING'S CURRENT PLACE IN PATENT DOCTRINE 
One of the most significant differences between patent law and 
other areas of intellectual property is that, in patent law, copying is 
irrelevant to the determination of infringement.3 It is axiomatic that 
patent infringement is a "strict liability offense."4 However, many 
components of patent law, patent theory, and even the rhetoric used 
3. See Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention 
Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002) ("Perhaps the most basic 
difference between patents and other intellectual property such as trade secrets and 
copyright is that independent invention is not a defence to infringement."). 
4. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2007). 
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in patent cases make copying a relevant consideration. Proposed 
reforms to the patent system would make copying even more directly 
relevant. 
A. Copying is Not Required to Prove Liability 
Courts assess patent infringement by comparing the allegedly 
infringing product or process to the patent's claims.5 An individual 
literally infringes if her technology practices each and every element 
of the claimed invention.6 Patent law requires nothing more. 
Questions of infringement do not focus on the alleged infringer's 
intent.7 Nor does infringement require evidence of copying the 
patent or commercial embodiments of the patented invention.8 For 
the initial liability determination in patent law, an "innocent" 
infringer is treated the same as an individual who copied the patented 
technology. Put simply, copying is irrelevant to the issue of liability. 
Nor is copying relevant to the determination of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents. Determining whether the alleged 
infringer's actions, while not falling within the literal scope of the 
claims, are equivalent to the claimed subject matter does not involve 
an inquiry into the infringer's state of mind or actions of copying.9 
The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically held that 
copying (or its absence) is irrelevant to infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.10 
Accordingly, in patent law, an individual who develops an 
already-patented technology without knowledge of the patent and the 
5. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that copying plays no role in the claim for allegedly infringing product or 
process comparison); see ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF 
PATENTLAW275 (2004). 
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 
374 (1996) ("Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 
'covers the alleged infringer's product or process ... .' ") (quoting HERBERT SCHWARTZ, 
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)). 
7. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 781 (4th ed. 2007) ("[T]he right to exclude does not depend upon the 
infringer's state of mind."); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 275 ("A defendant's 
intent is irrelevant to the outcome of an infringement inquiry."). 
8. See Allen Eng'g, 299 F.3d at 1351; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 781 (noting 
that 35 U.S.C. § 271 "does not require any proof of access to the inventor's work"). 
9. Allen Eng'g, 299 F.3d at 1351 (indicating that copying is irrelevant to the 
equivalents inquiry). 
10. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997) 
(concluding that "intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents"). 
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technology's prior creation-a true "independent inventor"-is still 
liable if what she independently created falls within the scope of the 
patent's claims. Liability of an independent inventor turns solely on 
the question of timing, not the independent nature of the second 
inventor's actions. As long at the patent's inventor was the first to 
invent the claimed technology, she can exclude anyone else who 
develops the claimed technology, independently or not. 11 The first 
individual to conceive of the invention-that is, mentally visualize the 
complete invention12-has superior rights to all future developers as 
long as she is diligent in either bringing her invention to the patent 
office or actually reducing the invention to practice from the time of 
conception by another inventor. 13 The second conceiver can even be 
the first to put the invention to actual use and still be considered an 
infringer.14 
The lack of a copying requirement for liability places patent law 
in sharp contrast with copyright and trade secret law. Copyright law, 
as its name connotes, requires an individual to copy the protected 
work to be found liable.15 While doctrines such as subconscious 
11. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 781. 
12. "Conception is the 'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in 
practice.'" Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)). "Conception is the touchstone of 
inventorship .... " Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). 
13. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (defining the standard for determining priority between 
two inventors of the same technology); Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (articulating the standard in reverse and noting that "priority of invention goes to 
the first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it 
was the first to conceive of the invention and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later 
reducing that invention to practice"); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 440-41. 
Reduction to practice is established by either actually implementing the invention or filing 
an enabling patent application. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). An actual reduction to practice that has been "abandoned, suppressed, 
or concealed" does not count for priority purposes. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 
14. Again, this holds true as long as the first conceiver is diligent from the "time prior 
to the conception by the other." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 
15. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946). Some circuits allow 
copying to be established by a "striking similarity" between the protected work and 
infringing works, even if there is no evidence that the alleged infringer had any access to 
the copyrighted work. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1988). But see 
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring proof of access even with a 
finding of striking similarity). Under such a test, some might argue that copying is not 
required to establish copyright infringement. However, the rationale for relying solely on 
striking similarity is that such evidence "preclude[s] the possibility of independent 
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copying potentially remove the state of mind from the copying 
requirement,16 actual copying is still a fundamental first step m 
determining copyright infringement. 17 
Trade secret law is similar, requmng an individual to 
misappropriate the trade secret to be held liable. Misappropriation 
occurs when the trade secret is obtained through improper means or 
through a breach of confidence.18 Either trigger for liability entails a 
"copying" of the trade secret. The infringer obtains the information 
from someone else-in most cases the trade secret's creator.19 And 
while trade secret law does preclude the use of information acquired 
by accident or mistake,20 the information must still be acquired from 
the trade secret owner and used with knowledge that it was 
inadvertently disclosed. By contrast, independent creation of the 
information, through normal means or reverse engineering, is a 
complete defense against a trade secret allegation.21 
Trademark law occupies a middle ground. Trademark 
infringement is based upon a finding of likely consumer confusion, 
which can occur without copying of the mark by the defendant. But 
intent to copy or deceive is one of the factors courts use in deciding 
consumer confusion,22 and recent work by Barton Beebe has found 
creation." Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, copying is still 
established essentially by inference. 
16. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998-99 & n.12 
(2d Cir. 1983) (finding liability even though the copying was subconscious and without 
intent); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A 
History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 178-79 (2007) (detailing the irrelevance of intent in 
modern copyright law). 
17. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The 
Copyright Act forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical work, 
the creator of that work is free to sell it."). 
18. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 529, 537-38 (2000); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 40 (1995). 
19. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-17 
(5th Cir. 1970) (finding liability where the infringer obtained the trade secret by improper 
means, namely, by taking aerial photographs of a trade secret holder's chemical plant 
under construction); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375-77 (7th Cir. 1953) (finding 
liability via a breach of confidence where the infringer obtained the trade secret in 
confidential negotiations with the trade secret holder). 
20. UN! F. TRADE SECRETS ACT§ 1. 
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 ("Independent 
discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper 
means of acquisition."); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 535. 
22. See Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Foods Imports Co., Inc., 703 
F.2d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that intent is "pertinent to a determination of 
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that, in fact, evidence of intent is the most significant factor predicting 
a finding of trademark infringement.B So, as a practical matter, 
trademark infringement usually involves copying, or at least a 
defendant's awareness of the plaintiff's mark. Patent law, then, 
stands alone among IP rights in not requiring or at least not strongly 
weighting evidence of copying. 
B. Copying Plays a Role in Other Patent Doctrines 
While copying isn't necessary for infringement, the existence of 
copying is not completely irrelevant in patent law. Many doctrines 
outside of the initial determination of infringement consider whether 
the alleged infringer or a third party has copied the patented 
technology. Some patent theory assumes, as a precondition, that 
others will copy the patented technology. Finally, much of the 
rhetoric used by courts and commentators when discussing patent 
infringement invokes the concepts of a copier and copying when 
identifying the infringer and describing her actions. 
1. Copying as an Element of Specific Patent Doctrines 
Whether a finding of patent infringement was the result of 
copying is relevant to the question of willful infringement and the 
accompanying enhancement of damages.24 "Willful infringement is 
... a measure of reasonable commercial behavior in the context of 
the tort of patent infringement."25 The act of copying the patented 
technology evidences the infringer's "disregard[] [for] the property 
rights of the patentee" and "the deliberateness of the tortious acts."26 
Patent law views such copying as "reprehensible" and, in turn, worthy 
likelihood of confusion"); Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d 
Cir. 1961) (indentifying "the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own 
mark" as one of the variables for determining likelihood of confusion). 
23. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CAL L. REV. 1581, 1608 (2006) ("The court found an intent to confuse 
consumers in sixty-seven opinions. In sixty-five (97%) of these opinions, the court found 
an overall likelihood of confusion."). 
24. See In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane) 
("Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only 
relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted."); Knorr-Bremse 
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (en bane). A finding of willfulness is required to enhance damages but does not 
require such an enhancement. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368. 
25. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
26. /d. 
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of punitive damages in the form of enhanced damages.27 Courts have 
even justified raising a reasonable royalty award to compensate for 
copying despite a finding that the infringement wasn't willfut.28 
Notably, while copying is evidence of willful infringement, copying is 
not required to prove willful infringement.29 In fact, as we shall see, 
most willfulness claims do not involve allegations of copying at all. 
Nor does evidence of copying, by itself, mean the infringement is 
willfuP0 
Copying is also relevant to the issue of patent validity as a 
secondary consideration of nonobviousnessY Copying of the 
patented invention by the infringer or a third party is seen by patent 
law as an indicator that the invention is nonobvious.32 The rationale 
is that a competitor engages in such copying only if they need a 
solution to the problem the invention addresses and they cannot 
come up with one on their own.33 Patent law also assumes that others 
copy only those inventions of technical value.34 Both of these 
assumptions based on the existence of copying are indicators that the 
27. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 134~9. 
28. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(expressing a concern that a reasonable royalty that is too low would "create a windfall for 
infringers" who intentionally engage in unauthorized use of the patented technology; the 
court in that case had rejected a willfulness claim). 
29. See, e.g., Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-
90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (setting out a multi-factor test to use in considering willfulness). 
30. !d. 
31. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 26 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the 
copying of the "claimed invention, rather than one in the public domain, is indicative of 
unobviousness" (quoting Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986))). 
32. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (citing the infringer's copying of the patented invention as evidence of 
nonobviousness ). 
33. See Dow Chern. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The copying of an 
invention may constitute evidence that the invention is not an obvious one .... This would 
be particularly true where the copyist had itself attempted for a substantial length of time 
to design a similar device, and had failed."); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness as 
an Exercise in Gap Measuring, in 2 INTELLECfUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH 21, 32 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) ("A competitor only engages in copying if they 
need a solution to the problem the invention addresses and they cannot come up with a 
solution on their own."). That rationale is open to question, however. A company may 
copy an invention not because it had no choice, but because it thought the invention was 
unpatented or unpatentable and therefore free to be used without need for reinvention. 
34. See Co tropia, supra note 33, at 32. 
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invention meets the nonobviousness requirement and is worthy of 
patent protection.35 
Third, copying is relevant to some claims for indirect 
infringement. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has made it clear that a 
defendant is not liable for inducing infringement by another unless it 
intended that the conduct it induced infringe a known patent.36 An 
inducement claim doesn't necessarily involve copying-a defendant 
might independently develop a technology, then learn of a patent 
covering it, and still encourage another to infringe that patent. 
However, the fact that inducement requires both knowledge of the 
patent and intent to encourage infringement means that inducement 
is more likely than ordinary infringement cases to involve allegations 
of copying.37 
Finally, as an exception to the general rule that copying is 
irrelevant to the question of liability, an accusation of infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) almost by definition involves acts of 
copying. Section 271(e)(2)(A) allows a patent holder to sue a generic 
drug manufacturer who files an abbreviated new drug application 
("ANDA") that contains a paragraph IV certification.38 Such a 
certification alleges that the previously approved drug to which an 
ANDA pertains is covered by patents that are invalid or will not be 
infringed by the generic drug. 39 In order to file a proper and 
successful ANDA, the generic drug manufacturer must "copy" the 
original drug-the generic's active ingredient must be the 
bioequivalent of the listed drug.40 These sets of facts that give rise to 
35. See id. (concluding that copying provides second-order evidence that the 
technology gap between the prior art and the invention is such that patent protection is 
warranted). 
36. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
37. Contributory infringement, by contrast, requires knowledge of the existence of the 
patent but not specific intent to infringe. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement, 
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1964). These claims too must involve awareness of the 
patentee's technology but are less likely to involve copying. 
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 
212 F.3d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "A charge of infringement under § 271(e)(2) is 
technical in nature" given that the ANDA filer has only sought FDA approval. 
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 287. 
39. See 21 U.S.C. § 355U)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006) (describing the content of a 
paragraph IV certification). 
40. An ANDA is proper only if the generic drug's active ingredient is the 
"bioequivalent" of the already approved drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355U)(2)(A)(iv). A 
generic drug is bioequivalent if the extent and rate of absorption of the drug are not 
significantly different from that of the already approved drug. See § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). 
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a § 271(e)(2) allegation of infringement mean that the generic drug 
producer has copied the patent holder's technology.41 It does not, 
however, necessarily mean that the patented invention was copied; the 
patent might cover something other than the active ingredient to 
which the generic is bioequivalent.42 
2. Copying as a Foundation for Particular Patent Theories 
Copying also plays a role in a number of patent theories. The 
idea that a patent constitutes a bargain with the public, in which the 
patentee gets exclusivity for a limited time in exchange for giving the 
public information about the invention, presupposes that companies 
will read and learn from the patent in order to copy the invention 
(albeit after the patent has expired). Improvement theory assumes 
that one of the patent law's benefits is that others refer to the patent 
document and the technology it describes in order to build upon that 
technology. Design-around theory assumes that others read patents 
in order to create competing, noninfringing alternatives to the 
patented technology. The doctrine of equivalents is also grounded in 
the assumption that defendants copy from patent owners. One view 
of that doctrine is that it is meant to catch the "unscrupulous copyist" 
who has set out to copy the patented technology and makes a minor 
change in order to avoid infringement via a technicality. 
a. The Disclosure Bargain and Improvement Theory 
The improvement theory of patent law describes patenting as a 
mechanism to both assist and prompt others to develop 
41. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the ANDA process "emerged from Congress' efforts to balance 
two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the 
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously 
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market"); Takeda 
Chern. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("When 
filing the ANDA the applicant must make a certification regarding any patent protecting 
the drug that will be copied."). 
42. An ANDA could be filed by an independent drug developer who was second to 
invent and must therefore go through the ANDA process to produce and sell the new 
pharmaceutical. This ANDA filer must still, however, claim bioequivalence. As a 
practical matter, this is a very uncommon occurrence. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 194 (1999) (noting that the main purpose behind the ANDA 
process is to encourage generic drug manufacturers to enter the market). 
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improvements to the already-patented technology.43 The patent 
disclosure, which is required to be enabling, provides technical 
information about the claimed invention.44 This technical information 
is publicly available and readily accessible, allowing anyone to both 
learn about the patented technology and then use this information to 
copy the invention once the patent expires or to create an 
improvement during the patent term.45 Building upon existing 
patented technology is a fundamental aspect of the patent system, 
and such improvements are crucial to technological advancement.46 
When such improvements are patented, another fundamental 
concept in patent law comes into play-blocking patents. The 
blocking patent's story begins with an inventor developing and 
patenting a base technology and then an improver building upon that 
base technology and patenting the improvement.47 This situation 
gives rise to two patents-one covering the base technology and one 
covering the improvement. Any party wishing to practice the 
improvement must get licenses from both the original developer and 
43. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[Patent law] 
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation .... "); Craig Allen 
Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 36-37 (2000) 
(indicating that one of the fundamental policies of patent law is to stimulate future 
innovation through the disclosure requirement). 
44. 35 U.S.C. § 112, CJ[ 1 (2006) (setting forth the requirement that the patent 
disclosure enable the claimed invention); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (describing the enablement requirement in patent law, which requires that 
"one skilled in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the claimed invention 
without undue experimentation"). 
45. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) 
(describing the "range of ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation"); 
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 
267 (1994) ("On issuance, a patent communicates a considerable amount of information 
that can help other would-be inventors, including rival firms."). But see Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 130-47 (2006) (questioning 
whether patent law truly promotes the disclosure of the invention); Note, The Disclosure 
Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2007--08 (2005) 
(same). 
46. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-908 (1990) (detailing how various technology 
industries develop incrementally); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30-31 (1991) 
(balancing the incentives required for first inventors and improvers building on that first 
invention). 
47. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1009-10 (1997) (noting that a "significant improvement" may be "itself 
protected by a patent"); Merges & Nelson, supra note 46, at 860-62. 
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the improver.48 The availability of patent protection for the improver, 
which creates the blocking patent, encourages the creation of the 
improvement because of the bargaining power patent exclusivity 
gives to the improving inventor.49 In the end, patent law facilitates 
the creation of improvements by both communicating the existence 
and technical details of the base technology and then providing patent 
protection for any patentable improvements that are developed. 
The theory that the patent system facilitates and encourages 
improvements assumes that potential improvers learn about the base 
technology from either the patent itself or a commercial embodiment 
of the patented invention. The improver is viewed as leveraging off 
of the earlier patent's technical description, and, in some instances, 
actually communicating and coordinating with the developer of the 
base technology. This all assumes some level of copying, or, at the 
very least, an awareness of the base technology and patent that sparks 
some modification to what has already been done. If there is no 
copying, then there is no improving from the viewpoint of the follow-
on inventor. She is, from her perspective, starting from scratch.5° For 
the patent system to play a role in improving technology, the base 
technology the system encourages must be known and used in some 
way by the improver. If she has not copied, her invention is not an 
improvement at all, but independent development of a better 
alternative (a "leapfrogging" invention). 
48. Lemley, supra note 47, at 1010 ("The original patent owner can prevent the 
improver from using his patented technology, but the improver can also prevent the 
original patent owner from using the improvement. Unless the parties bargain, no one 
gets the benefit of the improvement."). 
49. See id. at 1013. This power is by no means absolute, and a bargaining breakdown 
could nullify the benefit of the blocking patent. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 
82-91 (1994) (detailing and providing real-world examples of the bargaining breakdown 
between the base and improvement patent holders). 
50. This is not to say that a new technology is only an "improvement" if the improver 
actually references and uses an earlier technology in development of the new technology. 
Even if she thinks she is "starting from scratch," the result is still objectively an 
improvement to the earlier technology. State of mind is irrelevant to the definition of 
improvement. However, patent law's improvement theory focuses on the earlier category 
of improvements--ones in which the improver actually uses the base technology as the 
starting point for the new technology. 
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b. Design-Around Theory 
Design-around theory is a subset of the improvement theory. 
The theory is that the patent system sparks a specific type of 
"improvement"-a substitute to the patented technology that does 
not infringe the patentY A competitor, faced with the possibility of 
infringing the patent in order to compete in a given industry, reads 
the patent in order to determine how they can "design-around" the 
boundaries of the patent's claims.52 The patent, by promoting the 
creation of a commercial substitute through this design-around 
process, is socially beneficiai.53 The Federal Circuit has 
acknowledged that encouraging design-arounds is a goal of the patent 
system: "One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called 
'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even 
when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to 
the marketplace."54 
The design-around theory, like the improvement theory, assumes 
that the competitor who chooses to design around is aware of and 
working from the plaintiff's patent. Here, the theory assumes that the 
competitor reads the patent's claims when designing a competing 
product with the goal of making sure that the developed product does 
not fall within the patent's exclusivity. A successful design-around 
does not copy every element of the claimed technology; one might 
question whether they are really "copying" at all. But one who 
designs around an invention necessarily refers to and uses the 
patented invention in developing the competing product or process, 
and often uses the patented invention in the course of developing the 
noninfringing alternative. 55 
51. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
("Designing around patents is ... one of the ways in which the patent system works to the 
advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional 
purpose."). 
52. See Nard, supra note 43, at 40-41 ("As the term 'design-around' suggests, a 
competitor of the patentee may purposefully circumvent the boundaries of the patent 
claim and create a competitive, noninfringing alternative to the claimed invention."). 
53. !d. 
54. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For 
further discussion, see generally Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001). 
55. As Carl Shapiro has pointed out to us, design-arounds standing alone aren't 
socially valuable; it is the improvements they spark that the law really wants to encourage. 
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c. Doctrine of Equivalents Theory 
One justification for the doctrine of equivalents also assumes 
copying by potential infringers. As has already been mentioned, the 
U.S. Supreme Court specifically dismissed evidence of the infringer's 
copying of the patented invention (or alternatively, of the infringer's 
efforts to design around the invention) as irrelevant to the doctrine of 
equivalents inquiry.56 But the early judicial rationale behind the 
doctrine of equivalents built upon concepts of fairness and equity to 
justify the doctrine's existence.57 The Supreme Court concluded that 
limiting protection to the claim's literal scope allowed someone "to 
make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the 
patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the 
copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of 
law."58 Denying the patentee access to the doctrine of equivalents 
"would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous 
copyist. "59 
This reasoning assumes that there are individuals who target 
patented technologies, looking to appropriate the core value of the 
invention but to avoid being found liable for patent infringement by 
making minor variations. While this is not the only rationale for the 
doctrine,60 courts today, when discussing the rationale behind the 
doctrine of equivalents, still refer to the doctrine as a means to 
capture copiers.61 
56. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997). 
57. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent 
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 159-60 (2005) (detailing the doctrine's initial 
focus on notions of fairness and equity); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, 
Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1964-67 (2005) (noting that, into the twentieth century, "fairness concerns 
continued to dominate thinking about the doctrine of equivalents"). 
58. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950); see 
also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36 ("[O]ne wonders how to distinguish between the 
intentional copyist making minor changes to lower the risk of legal action, and the 
incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to capture as much as is 
permissible of the patented advance."). 
59. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. 
60. See Cotropia, supra note 57, at 160-62 (noting the current emphasis on a 
utilitarian theory of the doctrine and a focus on after-arising technologies); Meurer & 
Nard, supra note 57, at 1967-68 (describing the modern "friction theory" of the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
61. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860-61 
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting Graver Tank's copying discussion to describe the "import of the 
doctrine of equivalents"). 
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3. Copying as a Rhetorical Device 
The concept of copying also plays a role in the rhetoric used by 
courts and commentators when discussing patent infringement. An 
infringer of a patent claim is often said to have "copied"62 the 
invention and, in turn, is labeled a "copier"63 or "copyist."64 This 
terminology is used even when the infringer actually independently 
developed the infringing product or process. Likewise, an 
independent invention is often identified as a "copy"65 of an earlier 
patent though technically it was independently created. Such rhetoric 
even rises to the level of labeling the infringer a "thief"66 or their 
actions "stealing. "67 
The use of the term copying and its derivatives to characterize 
infringement is notable, given that patent law does not premise 
infringement on copying. The law places heavy weight on language; 
in turn, courts and commentators have an obligation to use language 
accurately. The linguistic slide from "infringer" to "copier" to "thief" 
presupposes that anyone who infringes is also copying and therefore 
stealing. That is an empirical proposition-and, as we show in Part II, 
a false one. Second, terms such as copying come with heavy baggage. 
They are loaded-"carry[ing] an undercurrent of disapproval, of 
62. See, e.g., SPX Corp. v. Bartee, USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (E.D. Mich. 
2008) (characterizing the allegation as one that "Bartee USA, LLC (Bartee) copied (the 
patented] design for a handheld tool used in servicing tires on motor vehicles equipped 
with remote tire monitoring systems," even though no actual allegation of copying was 
identified) (emphasis added). 
63. See, e.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok lnt'l, Inc., 998 F.2d 985,991 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (referring to patent infringers in general as "copiers"). 
64. See, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Corp., No. 01 C 6934, 2004 WL 
2260626, at *12 (N.D. III. Oct. 1, 2004) ("A patent holder is protected from efforts of 
copyists to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a 
patented invention." (citing Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 
u.s. 722,726 (2002))). 
65. See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30,41-42 (1929) ("There is 
a substantial identity, constituting infringement, where a device is a copy of the thing 
described by the patentee .... "). 
66. See, e.g., Victoria E. Luxardo, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate 
Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of 
'Fair Use' in Patent, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 791, 825-26 (2006) (calling corporations who 
infringe individual inventors' patents "patent thieves"). 
67. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d. 
Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.) (identifying the doctrine of equivalents as a vehicle to "prevent an 
infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention"). 
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unfavorable practices, of 'it's just not on.' "68 Allowing the use of the 
terms is particularly detrimental in jury cases because "a juror's 
everyday experience, stemming from earliest school days, generates 
the lay biases and pejorative flavor the word 'copy' carries."69 Finally, 
copying rhetoric is important because it may reflect reality or, if 
repeated enough, become reality. Scholars in the patent area have 
focused before on rhetoric as an indicator of what was70 or of what is 
coming.71 
C. Reforms to Copying's Role in Patent Law 
Finally, a number of commentators and legislators have 
proposed reforms that give copying a larger role in patent law. These 
reforms target copying's role in determining infringement and take 
the form of various degrees of independent inventor defenses. 
In its purest form, an independent inventor defense absolves any 
patent infringer of liability unless the infringement resulted from 
copying the claimed invention. That is, "independent conception of 
the invention and independent reduction of it to practice" would be a 
complete defense to infringement.72 Such an absolute defense does 
not exist in the United States. 
Stephen Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer articulate two 
advantages to an independent inventor defense.73 First, the threat of 
market entry by an independent inventor forces the patent holder to 
license at a lower price, reducing deadweight loss.74 In addition, the 
availability of an independent inventor defense also "reduces entry 
68. Kenneth R. Adamo et al., The Curse of "Copying," 7 J. MARSHALL REV. lNTELL. 
PROP. L. 296, 297 (2008). 
69. !d. 
70. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About 
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
953, 959-67 (2007) (investigating the "Jefferson story of patent law" by focusing, in part, 
on Thomas Jefferson's words). 
71. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033-41 (2005) (relying on the rising rate of court usage of the terms 
"intellectual property" and "free riding" as evidence that courts are viewing intellectual 
property more and more as a species of real property). 
72. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 475, 484 (2006). 
73. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 545. Vermont criticized Maurer & 
Scotchmer's analysis because it "assum[ed] a potential [independent inventor] can 
evaluate a patented invention and still invent independently." Vermont, supra note 72, at 
482. 
74. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 545. 
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into the [patent] race, and thus reduces wasteful duplication."75 One 
of their only concerns with such a defense is that "fraudulent claims 
of independence may be undetectable."76 
Samson Vermont argues for a modified independent inventor 
defense.77 Vermont's major modification is to limit the defense to 
instances where there is no actual or constructive notice of the 
patent.78 Actual notice entails the infringer seeing the invention 
before developing the infringing technology.79 Constructive notice is 
satisfied by the publication of an enabling disclosure of the 
invention.80 With the availability of constructive notice, a truly 
independent inventor who never sees the invention may still be 
denied the defense because of constructive notice. Vermont argues 
that such a defense reduces certain "system costs" while not 
detrimentally lowering the patent system's incentive to invent.81 
Finally, Carl Shapiro has offered a sophisticated economic 
justification for prior user rights (a variant on the independent 
inventor defense).82 
Not all analyses of an independent inventor defense are positive. 
One of the authors of this Article, while not rejecting independent 
invention out of hand, articulated some concerns with the defense.83 
First, the number of significant inventions that have occurred in a 
multiple, independent inventor setting means that an independent 
75. !d. 
76. !d. at 544. 
77. Vermont, supra note 72, at 484-89 (detailing the contours of a such a defense). 
Cecil Quillen advocates an independent-inventor defense as well, although in a different 
form. See Cecil D. Quillen, Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
207, 235 (2006) (proposing "an affirmative 'prior-independent-inventor' noninfringement 
defense that there is no infringement if the accused article or process (or the feature that 
causes it to be accused) was actually reduced to practice by the alleged infringer prior to 
the effective filing date of the asserted patent"). 
78. Vermont, supra note 72, at 485-87. 
79. !d. at 485-86. 
80. /d. at 486-87. 
81. /d. at 493-500. The system costs saved include monopoly losses, rent dissipation, 
and other miscellaneous costs such as patent prosecution and litigation costs. /d. at 490-
93. 
82. Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution 25-29 (Nat'l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13141, 2007), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13141.pdf. 
83. Lemley, supra note 4, at 1525. 
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invention defense would be a radical change in the patent system.84 
Our data in this paper strengthens that conclusion. Second, there is a 
risk that the availability of the defense will reduce the incentive to 
invest in important technologies. This is particularly true if the 
barrier to invention is cost, not the uncertainty of the results.85 In 
addition, for certain industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, 
"patent owners may need the power associated with a right of 
complete exclusion not just to encourage invention but to ensure that 
the inventor invests the resources to take the idea from invention 
through development to marketability."86 
An independent invention defense would focus the patent system 
on copying to some extent-absolutely in the case of a pure 
independent invention defense, and to a lesser extent if Vermont's 
hybrid proposal were adopted.87 
Patent law, in short, does not require proof of copying. But 
much of the thinking about the patent system by courts, 
commentators, and the public is built on the assumption that 
defendants are in fact copying inventions from patent owners. In Part 
II, we put that assumption to the test. 
II. THE SCARCITY OF COPIERS IN PATENT CASES 
Because copying is not an element of patent cases, there is no 
specific requirement that plaintiffs plead or prove that the defendant 
has copied the invention, either from the patent itself or from the 
plaintiff's commercial embodiment of the invention. Nonetheless, 
there is good reason to believe that plaintiffs will have strong 
incentives to plead and prove copying in cases where it exists. First, 
the fact that the defendant copied an invention from the plaintiff 
strongly suggests that the defendant's product infringes the patent; 
while parties can and do fight about the meaning of patent claims, if 
the defendant actually derived its product from the plaintiff's, it is 
likely to fit within any reasonable interpretation of most patent 
claims. Second, if the defendant copied from the plaintiff, that fact is 
likely to provide strong evidence that the defendant was a willful as 
84. /d. at 1528 (citing such examples of simultaneous invention as the steamboat, 
airplane, and laser). 
85. /d. at 1529. 
86. /d. at 1530-31. 
87. See Samson Vermont, The Angel is in the Big Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1537, 1544 (2007). 
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opposed to an innocent infringer, and therefore to justify an award of 
enhanced damages for infringement. The correspondence is not 
exact: a defendant may legitimately copy from the plaintiff if he has 
good reason to believe the patent is invalid-what the Federal Circuit 
has recently referred to as an objectively reasonable position.88 But 
copying by the defendant is certainly evidence of willfulness that 
patent owners will want to submit where available. Third, as we 
noted in Part I, there are specific advantages patent owners can get by 
proving copying, such as using that fact as evidence of 
nonobviousness. Finally, plaintiffs who face the prospect of a jury 
trial (as the overwhelming majority do )89 naturally want a good story 
to tell, and the story of theft is much more attractive than the story of 
inadvertent infringement. 
To evaluate whether plaintiffs made claims of copying in patent 
cases, we studied complaints for patent infringement. To determine 
how those allegations fared, we studied written decisions that involve 
copying. The combined data give us a useful window into the extent 
of copying in patent litigation. 
A. Allegations of Copying 
1. Data Collection 
To measure allegations of copying, we collected a sample of 200 
patent infringement complaints filed between January 1, 2000 and 
May 1, 2007, 100 each from two districts, the District of Delaware and 
the Eastern District of Texas. Those districts have significantly 
different characteristics-Delaware is the corporate headquarters of a 
plurality of large companies and the base of operation of major 
chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises, while eastern Texas is 
mostly rural and has very little innovation, but has recently become 
the district with the most patent cases because of its plaintiff-friendly 
88. See In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane). 
For discussion of the standard for willfulness and its problems, see, for example, Mark A. 
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1085, 1099-108 (2003). Doug Lichtman is the primary proponent of the 
objective standard the court adopted. See id. at 1115-16 (discussing Lichtman's proposal). 
89. By 1995, 70% of patent cases were tried to a jury. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1994 REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR, tbl.C-4, at A-37 (1994); Paul R. Michel, A View from the Bench: Achieving 
Eficiency and Consistency, 19 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 41, 42 (2000). 
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reputation.90 Of those 200 cases, we excluded seven, four because the 
PACER data files were corrupted or unavailable, two because they in 
fact involved only trade secret claims or attempts to file suit on a not-
yet-issued patent, and one that involved a design patent. As a result, 
our data set includes 193 useable cases.91 
For each of those 193 cases, we collected the initial complaint (if 
it was filed within our timeframe) as well as any amended complaints. 
We focused on amended complaints because it is possible that 
plaintiffs did not have evidence of copying when they filed their 
lawsuit, but later acquired such evidence; if so, it is reasonable to 
expect that some (if not all) of them would include that evidence in 
amended complaints. Our data set includes 179 initial complaints, 69 
first amended complaints, 21 second amended complaints, and 8 third 
or more amended complaints. 
2. Data on Allegations of Willfulness 
Of the 193 cases, plaintiffs alleged willfulness in the 
overwhelming majority: 157, or 81.3%.92 This is roughly consistent 
90. These data are from the Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse ("IPLC") 
Website, http:lllexmachina.stanford.edu (registration and login required). Because of the 
liberal patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006), patent plaintiffs can usually choose 
any district in the country to file suit. As a result, the location of plaintiffs or defendants in 
the district is less important than it is in other types of litigation. We selected these two 
districts because they are two of the top five districts for patent litigation and because the 
IPLC had data for those districts available at an early stage in its collection process. Once 
the IPLC was fully populated, we examined a random sample of cases from other districts 
to check the validity of our results. The outcome of this additional sample is reported 
infra where relevant. See infra notes 92, 98-99, 103. 
91. We use this sample as a tool to describe the approximate characteristics of the 
larger population of patent complaints. Since we use only a sample of complaints, we 
cannot predict with perfect accuracy the characteristics of the population as a whole. 
Accordingly, we determined the "confidence intervals"-the range within which we can be 
95% or 99% confident the actual number will fall-for all of the coding done. 
While all of the confidence intervals are available upon request, we report the 
confidence intervals in this Article that are important to the conclusions we identify, 
identifying the interval as the upper and lower bound percentages around the observed 
sample percentage (defined asp). 
92. The confidence interval for the percentage of complaints alleging willfulness is 
86.85% > p > 75.85%. 
We also looked for allegations of willfulness in another, independent sample of 
district court complaints filed in districts other than the Eastern District of Texas and the 
District of Delaware. Out of 102 complaints sampled, 72 were readable and included a 
claim of utility patent infringement. Out of these 72 complaints, 51 (70.83%) contained an 
allegation of willful infringement. The confidence interval for the percentage of 
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with Kimberly Moore's finding that willfulness was alleged in over 
90% of cases.93 While one might think this is evidence that at least 
plaintiffs believed copying was widespread, we cannot draw that 
conclusion because the legal definition of willfulness at the time these 
complaints were filed did not require proof of copying or even 
advance knowledge of the existence of the patent or the patent 
owner.94 It was sufficient to show that the defendant didn't stop 
infringing once it found out about the patent and didn't have good 
reason to believe that the patent was invalid or not infringed. 
In fact, there is good reason to believe that the allegations of 
willfulness do not in fact reflect evidence of widespread copying. Of 
the 193 cases, only 60 (or 31.1 %) involved allegations that the 
defendant was even aware of the patent before the lawsuit. It is 
common for patent plaintiffs to send a letter putting the defendant on 
notice of the existence of the patent; if the plaintiff did in fact send 
such a letter, we would expect the plaintiff to allege it, because in 
most cases patent damages begin to accrue only once the defendant 
receives such notice.95 The fact that nearly 70% of plaintiffs don't 
complaints alleging willfulness is 59.41% > p > 80.59%. This result confirms the findings 
of willfulness allegations in our first complaint sample. 
93. See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 
FED. C!R. B.J. 227, 232 (2004). Judge Moore found that 92% of the complaints in cases 
that terminated in 1999 or 2000 alleged willfulness. !d. It is not clear what explains the 
discrepancy between her findings and ours; our data set is substantially more recent 
(involving cases filed after 2000, when her cases terminated), so it is possible that 
allegations of willfulness have been declining over time. But sampling error or district-
specific effects may explain part of the discrepancy as well. 
94. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 88, at 1116-18. The Federal Circuit changed the 
standard in the last half of 2007, after these complaints were filed. In re Seagate Tech. 
LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane) (overruling the negligence 
standard for willful infringement set forth in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) in favor of an "objective 
recklessness" standard). But the new standard-"objective recklessness"-still does not 
require that the defendant copied the invention from the plaintiff; a weak argument 
coupled with a failure to make adequate investigation can still make even an independent 
developer a willful infringer. !d. at 1371. 
95. If the patentee makes physical products and marks them, that marking may 
constitute constructive notice of infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). If they do not 
mark their products, patentees can recover damages only for sales that occurred after the 
patentee gave notice of the patent to the defendant. If there is no marking and no notice, 
damages are not available except for sales made after the suit is filed. ld. Thus, there is 
substantial incentive to give notice of infringement in those situations. For discussion of 
the marking and notice requirements, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict 
Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 829-45 (2002). 
But marking does not apply to process patents or to those who don't sell products. Cf 
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even allege that the defendant was on notice of the patent at the time 
the lawsuit was filed suggests that the plaintiffs did not have evidence 
that the defendants in those cases had copied the patent.96 Further, of 
the 98 amended complaints in our database, only 3 were amended to 
add allegations of willfulness, providing at least some inferential 
evidence that most claims of willfulness don't involve actual 
knowledge of the defendant's intent. Were it otherwise, we would 
expect to see willfulness pled later in the case rather than at the 
outset, after discovery into defendant's intent. That doesn't appear to 
happen. 
3. Data on Allegations of Copying 
When we investigated allegations that might correspond to actual 
copying, the results were even more dramatic. Barely 10% (21 of 193, 
or 10.9%) of the complaints we studied alleged that the defendant 
had copied the invention, either from the patent or from the 
plaintiff's commercial product.97 And we might think of this in some 
respects as an upper bound, because these include bare allegations 
that the defendant copied the invention. For example, we included in 
this category an allegation that the defendant has "built their system 
on use of [plaintiff's] patents" and an allegation that defendant's 
product is "a substantial copy" of plaintiff's, both of which might be 
JANICE M. MUELLER, AN lNTRODUCfiON TO PATENT LAW 410 (2d ed. 2006) ("The 
§ 287(a) marking statute does not apply to patents that claim only processes or methods 
.... "). For criticism of the rule as applied to online methods, see generally Tim Hsieh, 
The Adequacy of the Mark: Raising the Standard Under 35 U.S. C. § 287(a) for Patented 
Online Software Methods, 48 IDEA 69 (2007). 
96. That doesn't mean the defendants in those cases didn't actually copy, of course; 
just that the plaintiff had no basis on which to allege that they did, even as of the date of 
filing of the amended complaints. 
97. The confidence interval for the percentage of complaints alleging copying is 
15.27% > p > 6.49%. In our second sample of complaints, see supra note 92, twelve of the 
seventy-two complaints (16.67%) contained an allegation of copying. The confidence 
interval for the percentage of complaints in this second sample alleging copying is 
24.47% > p > 7.53%. While the observed percentage of copying in the second sample falls 
outside the confidence interval of our initial sample, the two confidence intervals for the 
samples do overlap substantially. In addition, the percentage of allegations of copying in 
this second sample is still quite small, further substantiating our observations in this 
Article. The results of the second sample suggest that the actual percentage of complaints 
alleging copying may be higher than 10.9%, but not much higher. 
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general uses of the term "copy" or "use" to refer to similarity rather 
than derivation.98 
Using this data, we can look at how related allegations of 
willfulness are to allegations of copying. In the 157 complaints 
alleging willfulness, 18 of those complaints also alleged copying 
(11.46% ). Likewise, of the remaining 36 complaints not containing a 
willfulness allegation, 3 included an allegation of copying (8.33% ). 
These two percentages are fairly similar, suggesting that there is no 
significant relationship between allegations of copying and allegations 
of willfulness. The result of a Fisher's Exact Test on the data 
confirms this finding, returning a p-value of 0.7077.99 
Even more significant is the fact that 13 of the 21 cases alleging 
copying are pharmaceutical patents filed against generic ANDA 
filers. Because of the mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic 
pharmaceutical defendants necessarily must copy the plaintiff's active 
ingredient to achieve bioequivalence.100 
The prevalence of ANDA cases in the small subset of cases that 
allege copying also points to another fact: whether patent plaintiffs 
allege copying depends on particular industries. In Table 1, we report 
98. This demonstrates how broad a definition of an "allegation of copying" we used in 
our study-both when looking at complaints and opinions. Essentially, an allegation of 
any use of the patent or a commercial embodiment of the patented technology in the 
development of the allegedly infringing product or process was considered an allegation of 
copying, even though many such uses would not in fact be "copying" by most definitions. 
To be sure, there may be situations in which a defendant does not copy the plaintiff's 
invention or even see it but nonetheless is indirectly influenced by it. If a defendant is 
aware that the plaintiff has succeeded in making the invention, for instance, but doesn't 
know how, the mere knowledge that it can be done might itself be an aid to the defendant 
in developing its own product. We don't class this as copying, though some might find it to 
be a "use" of the plaintiff's invention in some sense. 
99. This is the two-tail p-value. For the distribution to be statistically significant, a p-
value must be less than 0.05. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 484 (3d ed. 
1998). A p-value less than 0.01 is considered highly statistically significant. /d. 
We selected the Fisher's Exact Test over the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test to 
measure statistical significance because of the small population size and the limited 
number of positives in the results being compared here. See B.S. EVERITT, THE 
ANALYSIS OF CONTINGENCY TABLES 7, 15-16 (2d ed. 1992); GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & 
WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 126-27 (8th ed. 1989) (explaining that 
the Fisher's Exact Test is favored over the Chi-Squared Test for smaller expected 
frequencies). 
100. This proportion varies slightly in our second random sample. See supra note 97. 
Of the twelve instances of copying in this second sample, three are based on ANDA 
filings. That may reflect a smaller overall percentage of pharmaceutical cases in the 
second random sample, which excluded cases from Delaware, where many pharmaceutical 
patent cases are filed. 
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not only the overall data on copying but also the industry-specific 
data.101 
Table 1: Complaint Data By Industry 
... ;;,' 
... ;Wilt"': llflll'~,, 
.. ~ .Departing Change Numl)er in Industry ·fu~.·· Emp'ees Cases Alleged? Alleged? Allega-· tions? 
Pharmaceutical 20 17 12 13102 0 0 1 
Medical 8 6 2 0 1 1 1 
Biotechnology 10 6 2 0 0 0 0 
Computer- 76 62 21 2 4 0 0 
related 
Software 67 54 21 2 2 0 0 
Semiconductor 11 9 2 0 0 0 0 
Electronics 31 27 9 2 3 2 1 
Chemistry 25 22 16 14 1 1 1 
Mechanics 38 30 12 3 2 1 0 
Acoustics 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Optics 14 12 2 0 1 1 0 
Automotive 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 
Energy 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Communication 31 23 12 1 0 0 0 
TOTALS 193 157 60 21 10 5 2 
As noted above, 10.9% of the overall cases allege copying. But 
the percentage of cases that allege copying by industry range from a 
low of 0% in optics and in semiconductors to a high of 65% in 
pharmaceuticals.103 It is also worth noting that the two largest classes 
101. We use the fourteen industry categories created and defined in John R. Allison & 
Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2110-12 (2000). Note that patents can and frequently do fit into 
more than one industry category, which is why the industry totals exceed the total number 
of patents. 
102. Thirteen of sixteen ANDA cases involved allegations of copying; three other 
ANDA cases presumably involved copying but did not specifically allege it. 
103. To avoid meaningless results, we report in text only the results for those industries 
with more than ten cases in our sample. 
While the chemistry industry also produces a high result, 56% copying, that result 
is driven by the fact that most of the pharmaceutical cases are also chemistry cases. If we 
exclude pharmaceutical cases, there are only nine chemistry cases in the data set and only 
one (11%) alleges copying. 
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in our sample, computer-related inventions and software, have 
extremely low levels of alleged copying (2.6% and 3.0%, 
respectively).104 From this data, we observe a highly statistically 
significant difference between allegations of copying in 
pharmaceutical cases and similar allegations in computer-related and 
software cases. 105 Allegations of copying are more likely in the 
chemical than in the IT industries. 
To try further to parse these allegations of copying, we reviewed 
the complaints to determine what particular facts were alleged that 
might support an inference of copying. We found that 10 of the 193 
complaints, or 5.2%, involved allegations of a prior business 
relationship between the firms, something that might plausibly have 
led to copying. Only 5 of the 193 complaints, or 2.6%, include an 
allegation of misappropriation of trade secrets, which necessarily 
requires an allegation of copying. And only 2 cases involve 
allegations of infringement by departing employees.106 None of these 
taken alone is particularly strong evidence; it is certainly possible that 
a defendant copied the plaintiff's invention in the marketplace or 
read the patent and used it to design its product, though the latter in 
particular would seem an odd business decision. And trade secret 
claims exist in some tension with patent claims, since one requires 
secrecy and the other requires disclosure.107 However, these data 
The confidence interval for the percentage of pharmaceutical complaints alleging 
copying is 85.9% > p > 44.1 %. The confidence interval for the percentage of chemical 
complaints alleging copying is 75.46% > p > 36.54%. 
104. The confidence interval for the percentage of computer-related complaints 
alleging copying is 6.23% > p > 0%. The confidence interval for the percentage of 
software complaints alleging copying is 7.07% > p > 0%. 
105. A Fisher's Exact Test gives a p-value < 0.0001. Since these industries commonly 
appear in pairs for a given invention-with pharmaceutical and chemical appearing 
together and computer-related and software appearing together-the observations of 
alleged copying were similarly paired and placed in a 2x2 table when performing the 
Fisher's Exact Test. 
A similar result is observed in our second random sample of complaints. See 
supra notes 92 and 97. Of the twelve complaints containing an allegation of copying, four 
allegations were in pharmaceutical and/or chemical cases while no allegations were in 
computer-related or software cases. 
106. These numbers can't merely be added together; the two departing employee cases, 
for example, are also two of the cases that involve trade secret claims. 
107. See Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 
1953) (requiring election between patenting and secrecy). For complications of this 
general rule, compare Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Typically, the publication of a patent terminates all trade secret 
rights."), with Evans Cooling Sys. v. General Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 
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points reinforce the idea that not merely express allegations of 
copying, but allegations of facts that might involve copying, are 
surprisingly rare. 
Finally, it is quite possible that even where defendants are 
engaged in copying, the plaintiffs may not know of that copying at the 
time they file their complaints. To try to assess this, we evaluated 
changes in allegations to see whether amended complaints added 
allegations of willfulness or copying. Only two amended complaints 
added allegations of copying, and only three added allegations of 
willfulness. While it is of course possible that plaintiffs discovered 
evidence of copying too late to amend the complaint, or discovered it 
but decided not to amend the complaint, for the reasons we suggested 
above we think plaintiffs who were already amending their 
complaints would likely have been motivated to add those allegations 
if possible.108 
Patent infringement, like most causes of action in the federal 
system, is governed by the relatively lax rules of notice pleading.109 
As a result, it is possible that plaintiffs simply do not include 
allegations either of copying or of the facts that might give rise to 
copying, opting instead for a simple complaint that merely identifies 
the patent and the defendant's product. As noted above, we think 
there are substantial reasons to allege copying when the plaintiff has 
evidence of it. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the data in this Section may 
undercount the number of cases in which plaintiffs believe defendants 
have copied their invention, because some of those plaintiffs may 
simply not have mentioned that fact in their complaints. 
To guard against this possibility, we collected 102 actual reported 
decisions that litigate issues involving evidence of copying.U° For 
each of those decisions, we then collected the associated complaints 
from IPLC and ran the same analysis we ran on the randomly 
1997) (invalidating a patent based on public use by an alleged thief; the court reasoned 
that the patentee could have filed a trade secret claim). 
108. There is also the possibility that a defendant did in fact copy, but evidence of 
copying was never discovered. However, such a situation is highly unlikely given the 
incentive to label the infringer a "copier" and the broad scope of discovery under the 
federal rules. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 8. 
110. There were 107 cases collected, but in two cases the files were corrupted, and in 
three cases the complaints were unavailable. We discuss the results of those decisions in 
Part II.B infra. 
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selected complaints. This should provide a useful check on the 
problem of underpleading; if copying is not alleged in these 
complaints, which ultimately involve litigation of copying issues, it 
would suggest that our approach might be missing some substantial 
evidence of copying. 
We report the aggregate results in Table 2. 
Table 2: Copying Allegations in Complaints Where Copying Is 
Ultimately Litigated 
Total Cases . ' 1QZ ,'( :; 
Willfulness Alleged 68 (66.7%) 
Actual Notice Prior to Threat 44 (43.1%) 
Copying Alleged 96 (94.1 %) 
Prior Business Dealings 9 (8.8%) 
Trade Secrets 4 (3.9%) 
Departing Employees 1 {1.0%} 
Changes in Allegations 6 (5.9%) 
These results confirm that, for allegations of copying, complaints 
are nearly as good a metric as written opinions. Of those cases where 
allegations of copying appeared in an opinion, almost all of the 
complaints also included such allegations-94.1% to be exact.111 This 
means that in only 5.9% of the cases did an allegation of copying 
appear in a district court opinion but not in the corresponding 
complaint for the case. There is, therefore, good reason to believe 
that if a patent case involves questions of copying that are mentioned 
in a decision, these allegations also appear in the complaint. 
To make sure this cross-check is not skewed by the certainty of 
copying in ANDA cases pursuit to our coding methodology, we 
backed ANDA cases out of the analysis. The percentage changes 
slightly, but not much, when ANDA cases are removed. Of the 102 
cases where the complaints were examined, 55 were ANDA cases-
which are coded as cases alleging copying. Of the remaining 47 cases, 
41 included allegations of copying both in the complaint and the 
written opinion-87 .23% .m 
111. It is worth noting that a Fisher's Exact Test looking at the difference between 
allegations of copying appearing in the complaint dataset compared to the opinion dataset 
produces a two-tailed p-value of 0.0290. 
112. Fisher's Exact Test produces a two-tailed p-value of 0.0264. 
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B. Court Findings of Copying 
To get further evidence of copying in patent cases, we turn from 
complaints to decided cases. 
1. Data Collection 
In order to measure actual findings of copying in patent cases, we 
looked at district court opinions available on WESTLAW.113 We 
collected an initial set of opinions that included all opinions in cases 
involving an allegation of patent infringement issued on January 1, 
2006 to February 29, 2008.ll4 We then searched the resulting set of 
opinions to identify situations where there were multiple opinions 
issued during the defined time period for a single case. Multiple 
opinions for a single case were collapsed to one "case" entry.115 As a 
result, we had a final dataset that included 1,871 patent infringement 
cases in which opinions were published on WESTLA W during a 26-
month period.116 
113. The search was done on WESTLA W's U.S. District Courts Cases ("DCT") 
database. The DCT database "has all available federal district court cases with coverage 
beginning in 1945." See WESTLAW Scope for the DCT database. "All available" is 
misleading-the database includes all those opinions that WESTLA W wishes to make 
electronically available. This includes all opinions found in the Federal Supplement series 
published by WESTLA W and other opinions that WESTLA W chooses to publish. 
114. The specific search to capture this set of data was "PATENT /3 INFRING! & 
da(aft 12/31/2005 & bef 3/1/2008)." The results from this search were then reviewed to 
remove those opinions that did not involve actual allegations of patent infringement. 
We treated as involving allegations of patent infringement both claims of patent 
infringement appearing in the complaint and counterclaims of the same. An opinion was 
deemed to contain an allegation of patent infringement even if the patent infringement 
claim had been dismissed or adjudicated prior to the opinion's issuance. Claims of 
infringement based solely on design or plant patents were not considered "patent 
infringement cases" for the purposes of this study. 
115. Weighting by cases rather than opinions makes sense so as to not overweight 
those cases where there are multiple opinions. 
116. In comparison to the sampling study used to examine complaints, we used a 
population study when looking at opinions. As one author has previously noted, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to generate a random, representative sample using reported 
cases. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194 n.20 (1998) ("[W]hen using reported cases as 
data sources, there are intractable problems with treating the grouping of cases as a 
representative random sample, regardless of how carefully one has defined the grouping. 
Although it is self-evident that any grouping of cases represents a subset of something 
larger, i.e., a population of something, it is practically impossible to assure that the 
grouping is a representative sample, much less a random one."). 
A population study can both be used to generate descriptive data and 
predictions-the predictions coming from "treating the population as a subset of a 
1450 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
We then coded the patent infringement opinions for these cases 
in the following three ways. First, we identified opinions mentioning 
allegations of copying.m We used the same liberal approach for 
identifying allegations of copying as we did when coding 
complaints. 118 We further investigated opinions that included 
allegations of copying to determine whether copying was actually 
proven. 119 A finding of copying for the purposes of this study 
included only those findings that the patented invention was copied.120 
'superpopulation'-in this case the hypothetical population of all past and future ... 
decisions-without pretense that the data set is a representative sample of that 
superpopulation." /d. (citing M.E. Thompson, Superpopulation Models, in 9 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STAT. SCI. 93 (1988)). 
Accordingly, with a population study, there is no need to generate confidence 
intervals for the results. But, just to be sure, we undertook a similar analysis as Christian 
Chu in his empirical patent claim construction article. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1075, 1094-95 (2001). In order to get a 95% confidence level with a margin of error at 5% 
for determinations of whether the population includes instances of allegations of copying 
or findings of copying, we would need a sample size, N, of at least 384. See id.; SUSAN F. 
WAGNER, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 201-02 (1992) (defining N=(Zarz)'(PQ)!B', 
where z. is the z-score for the confidence interval, Pis the sample proportion, Q is (1-P), 
and B stands for the margin of error). The population includes 1,871 cases, well above the 
N we would need to reach a 95% confidence level. 
117. We did this in a two-step process. We began with a keyword search. For example, 
the dataset was searched for the presence of the words "copying," "copied," "copy," 
"duplicat!," "imitat!," "counterfeit!," "forger!," "steal!," and "stole!" within the same 
paragraph as the word "patent." Then the results of that search, and others, were 
examined by hand to gain a full understanding of whether the copying of the patented 
technology, if any, was alleged. In the end, while the initial searches were quite broad as 
to what trigger words would find discussion of copying, the word itself-"copy" and its 
derivatives-found almost all copying discussions in the dataset. This is not to say that 
other copying-related words did not also appear in the same opinion, merely that adding 
those words did not bring in many additional cases. 
118. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the definition of "allegation 
of copying" used in this study). 
What makes this approach even more likely to overcount instances of copying is 
the possibility that judges are using terms such as "copying" rhetorically, as opposed to 
literally. See supra Part I.B.3. 
119. A finding of copying took many forms, from the result of a bench trial to an 
admission by the defendant. See, e.g., Erico Int'l Corp. v. Doc's Mktg., Inc., No. 
1:05cv2924, 2006 WL 1174259, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2006) ("Here, Defendant openly 
has admitted that it engaged in direct copying of the Plaintiffs patented products."). In an 
ANDA case, copying was considered "found" if infringement was found. 
120. By contrast, an opinion that found copying of non-patented aspects of the 
plaintiff's technology, while coded as an allegation of copying, was not coded as a finding 
of copying for the purposes of this study. See, e.g., Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., No. C 
98-20451 JF, 2006 WL 3302476, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006) (noting that copying of a 
non-claimed feature was irrelevant to the question of willful infringement). Our definition 
2009] COPYING IN PATENT LAW 1451 
Second, we made a separate pass through the dataset of patent 
infringement cases to identify cases that involved allegations of willful 
infringement.121 For those cases containing allegations of willful 
infringement, we determined whether the allegation was decided, and 
if so, whether willful infringement was found or not.122 We also coded 
the willfulness cases by industry.123 
Third, we conducted a final search of the patent infringement 
dataset to identify all opinions mentioning allegations of infringement 
based on filings of an ANDA-that is infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A).124 
2. Data on Claims of Copying 
Out of the 1,871 patent infringement opinions in the dataset, 129 
of them ( 6.89%) included an allegation of copying that was 
mentioned in an opinion. Of these 129 cases, the allegation of 
copying was based on the filing of an ANDA in a little over half of 
the cases-78 '(60.47%) of the cases.125 Copying was actually found in 
33 cases (25.58% ), with the finding occurring in 22 of the ANDA 
cases and 11 of the non-ANDA cases. When placed in the context of 
all of the patent infringement cases in the study, copying was 
established in only 1.76% of all cases in the dataset. 
A couple of observations can be made. First, the percentage of 
cases where copying was alleged dropped from 10.9% when we 
looked at the complaints to 6.89% when we looked at opinions. 
of proven copying narrowed in that a finding of copying did not include findings that an 
alleged infringer successfully designed-around a patent claim or copied an element that 
was not covered by the asserted patent claims. 
121. We did this in two steps, just as with our coding of copying. We searched 
WESTLA W to identify discussions of willful infringement. For example, the dataset was 
searched for the presence of any derivative of the string "willful" within three words of the 
string "infring!." Then, the results of that search, and others, were examined by hand to 
gain a full understanding of the willful infringement, if any, that was actually alleged. 
122. For example, an allegation of willfulness was deemed "decided" if the opinion 
reported a jury verdict, bench trial determination, ruling on a judgment as a matter of law, 
or decision on summary judgment. 
123. The same categories used in the early part of this Article were used here. See 
supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
124. Again, this was done by searching WESTLAW-for example searching for the 
strings "ANDA'' or "abbreviated new drug application"-and then processing those 
results by hand. 
125. All ANDA cases were coded as cases alleging copying due to the nature of the 
§ 271(e)(2)(A) claim. However, it is worth repeating, the copying necessary for filing an 
ANDA may not be copying of the patented technology. 
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Looking at the descriptive data, there appears to be a higher 
likelihood that an allegation of copying will appear in a complaint as 
opposed to a written decision. 126 The most obvious explanation for 
this discrepancy is that allegations are just that-allegations-and not 
all will be proven in court. The difference may also reflect the fact 
that a district court has little reason, in many cases, to mention 
copying in a written opinion. For example, some decisions that 
involve claims of copying may not need to resolve the copying issue 
and therefore may not discuss it. It is also worth noting that the 
6.89% finding of allegations of copying in court decisions falls within 
the confidence interval (margin of error) of the percentage of 
complaints that include copying allegations.127 
Second, the fact that a little over half of the copying allegations 
and two-thirds of the findings of copying occurred in ANDA cases is 
explained by the nature of the ANDA patent litigation. This falls in 
line with the data from complaints, with around 60% of cases alleging 
copying both in complaints and opinions being ANDA cases. As 
previously explained, ANDA cases inherently involve copying of the 
patentee's product by the alleged infringer, and in most such cases the 
copying is of the patented technology.128 And when infringement is 
found, that infringement generally means that the patented invention 
was copied in the AND A. 
Finally, and most noteworthy, is the very small number of cases 
where copying was actually found. Such findings make up just over 
1% of the cases included in this part of our study. And if the ANDA 
cases are removed because of their unique linkage to copying, 
findings of copying drop to less than half a percent. 
However, while the percentage of actual findings of copying may 
be low, there is also a real possibility of underreporting. Even if 
patentees want to argue copying, there is typically no reason for a 
court to mention copying in a patent infringement opinion because 
copying is irrelevant to the core issue in these cases-liability. In fact, 
126. We performed a Pearson's Chi-Squared Test for statistical significance. See 
generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 157--62 
(2d ed. 2001) (describing the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test). The data set was too large for 
a Fisher's Exact Test. A Pearson's Chi-Squared Test produces a p-value of 0.04238, which 
means that the difference is statistically significant, but just barely. 
127. See supra note 97 (noting that the confidence interval for the complaint incidents 
of alleged copying is 15.27% > p > 6.49% ). 
128. In other cases the patent may cover an inactive ingredient or a dissolution profile. 
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the Federal Circuit has admonished courts that discuss copying in the 
context of patent infringement.129 
3. Data on Willful Infringement Findings 
An alternative way to determine the amount of copying that 
actually takes place in patent infringement cases is to focus on those 
patent infringement cases where copying is explicitly relevant to the 
opinion being written. In opinions discussing patent issues where 
copying is relevant-in willfulness, inducement, or nonobviousness 
decisions for example-a court is more likely to be presented with 
evidence of copying and, in turn, more likely to mention and decide 
the question of copying the patent.130 The law makes copying 
relevant in these contexts, and therefore a litigant's push to make 
copying an issue is more likely to be reflected in a written opinion 
(and it is extremely likely that plaintiffs who can allege or argue 
copying will do so). At the same time, just considering these cases 
would overstate the amount of copying, since copying is by definition 
far more likely to be raised in successful patent cases that involve 
willfulness allegations than in the litigation population at large. 
As a result, we focused on cases involving allegations of willful 
infringement in order to estimate an upper bound on allegations and 
proof of copying in patent cases. In the dataset, there were 226 cases 
(12.08%) where an allegation of willful infringement was 
mentioned.131 An allegation of copying was mentioned or implied in 
40 (17 .70%) of these cases.132 A decision on willfulness was reported 
129. See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 
cf Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. v. Epilogics Group, No. 03-CV-70181-DT, 2008 WL 183546, 
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2008) (labeling the patentee's argument that copying is relevant 
to the question of liability as "disingenuous"). 
130. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int'l v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312 2008 WL 63233, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2008) ("[P]re-patent conduct is relevant to a determination of willfulness 
... when that pre-patent conduct consists of egregious copying (citing cases)."). 
131. The difference between this result and that observed with allegations of 
willfulness in complaints is highly statistically significant, with a Pearson's Chi-Square test 
producing a p-value < 0.0001. That is, it is significantly more likely that a complaint will 
contain an allegation of willfulness than an opinion. This observation is explained by the 
fact that a district court has no reason to mention an allegation of willful infringement 
unless the allegation is being decided. And the issue of willfulness is not addressed until 
most of the other issues in a given case are resolved in the patentee's favor. Therefore, in 
the opinion data, there is likely significant underreporting of willfulness allegations. 
132. As before, patent infringement claims based on the filing of ANDAs are treated 
as allegations of copying the patented technology. 
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in 77 (34.07%) of the 226 total cases. The split in results on 
willfulness was roughly 50-50-with willful infringement being found 
in 42 cases (54.55%) and not found in 35 cases (45.45%). Copying 
was alleged in 20 (25.97%) and found in 8 (10.39%) of the 77 cases 
deciding willfulness. A finding of copying resulted in a finding of 
willful infringement in 7 out of 8 cases (87 .5%) where willfulness was 
actually decided. The remaining case finding copying had yet to 
decide the willfulness issue.133 
Mentions of copying, both allegations and actual findings, were 
more prevalent in willfulness decisions (17.70%) than in the 
published decisions more generally (6.89% ). And this difference is 
highly statistically significant.134 This is not surprising given that 
copying is relevant to such an inquiry, but this result does differ from 
our complaint results, where there was no significant relationship 
between allegations of willfulness and allegations of copying.135 
But even here, the existence of copying allegations in published 
decisions did not rise dramatically, moving from 6.89% in the context 
of all of the cases to 17.70% in the context of only willfulness cases. 
The amount of copying found also did not jump significantly, rising 
from 1.76% in the context of all cases to 4.87% in the context of cases 
mentioning an allegation of willfulness. This view of the dataset may 
give us a better understanding of the amount of copying actually 
occurring in patent infringement cases given that courts have a reason 
to mention and decide the issue. The low percentages, however, still 
tell the same story as our earlier analysis-surprisingly little copying 
has occurred in these litigated cases. 
It is also worth noting that when a court decides the willfulness 
issue and also finds copying, the court almost always deems the 
infringement willful. This data suggests that actual copying is good 
evidence of willful infringement. The one case in which copying did 
not support a finding of willfulness was an ANDA caseY6 This is not 
133. For example, in one case, copying was admitted, but the court had yet to decide 
the issue of willfulness. See Erico Int'l Corp. v. Doc's Mktg., Inc., No. 1:05cv2924, 2006 
WL 1174259, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2006). 
134. The existence of copying allegations in willfulness cases is highly statistically 
significant, with a Pearson's Chi-Square test producing a p-value < 0.0001. 
135. The difference in statistical results between complaints and opinions is likely a 
continuation of the higher incident of willfulness allegations in complaints as compared to 
opinions. See supra note 131. 
136. See Janssen, L.P. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 07-1515 (JAP), 2008 WL 323558, at *3 
(D. N.J. Feb. 4, 2008). 
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surprising, given that there is Federal Circuit case law holding that the 
action of filing an ANDA, by itself, is not evidence of willful 
infringement.137 District courts have repeatedly found no willful 
infringement even in light of the copying that accompanies an 
ANDA. 138 The fact that-at least outside of ANDA cases-
successful proof of copying overwhelmingly leads to a finding of 
willfulness bolsters our assumption that patentees have a strong 
incentive to allege and prove copying where they can. 
The cases alleging willfulness can also be broken down by 
industry. Table 3 below depicts the industries involved in cases 
alleging willfulness. Specifically, Table 3 provides the number of 
cases for a given industry that involved allegations of copying and 
then actual findings of copying.U9 For a given industry, percentages 
are provided that indicate the percentage of cases where willfulness 
was alleged, willfulness was found, copying was alleged, and copying 
was found. 
137. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("An ANDA filing by its very nature is a 'highly artificial act of 
infringement,' therefore, the trial court need not have elevated the ANDA certification 
into a finding of willful infringement.") (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 
u.s. 661, 678 (1990)). 
138. See, e.g., Janssen, L.P., 2008 WL 323558, at *3 n.1 (citing eight district court 
opinions where an allegation of willful infringement was dismissed because it was based 
solely on the act of filing the ANDA). 
139. The numbers are bigger than the total number of cases observed because of the 
fact that the invention in one case can involve multiple industries. 
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Table 3: Copying by Industry in Cases Including Willfulness 
Allegations 
,_,., ,,,. , ... ':•, :~~: f,n;v;::r;tf5 :, '.;;"o:ipymg Copying ~;:;;~,}·.·;: ' ,· '··. 'i:·:;;~~,' Found ' '·•' 
Pharmaceutical 15 0 (0%) 15 (100%) 3 (20%) 
Medical Devices 23 3 (13.04%) 6 (26.08%) 2 (8.7%) 
Biotechnology 15 4 (26.67%) 3 (20%) 0 (0%) 
Computer-related 67 14 (20.90%) 4 (5.97%) 1 (1.49%) 
Software 46 9 (19.57%) 3 (6.52%) 1 (2.17%) 
Semiconductor 8 1 (12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 0(0%) 
Electronics 24 5 (20.83%) 2 (8.33%) 0 (0%) 
Chemistry 30 1 (3.33%) 18 (60%) 3 (10%) 
Mechanics 93 20 (21.51 %) 13 (13.98%) 7 (7.53%) 
Acoustics 1 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 
Optics 9 1 (11.11%) 0 (0%) 0(0%) 
Automotive 8 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 1 (12.5%) 
Energy 5 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 
Communications 9 3 (33.33%) 1 (11.11 %) 1 (11.11 %) 
This data m1m1cs the results from complaint data in most 
respects. As with complaints, pharmaceutical and chemical cases 
make up a large portion of those cases mentioning allegations of 
copying and finding actual copying. On the other end of the spectrum 
are computer-related and software cases, where there was a large 
number of cases alleging willful infringement, but a small number of 
allegations and findings of copying. As with our findings with respect 
to complaints, there is a highly statistically significant difference 
between allegations of copying in pharmaceutical and chemical cases 
as compared to computer-related and software cases.140 Again, 
allegations are more likely to exist in pharmaceutical and chemical 
cases. 
C. Interpreting the Data 
None of these measures is perfect. Data based on complaints are 
in one sense likely to overstate the amount of copying, since it merely 
140. A Pearson's Chi-Square test produced a p-value of 0.0002. 
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requires that the plaintiff allege something even in general terms, not 
that it be proven. On the other hand, that data may well understate 
the amount of copying, because some plaintiffs may not include an 
allegation of copying even if they believe it to have occurred, or may 
find out about copying too late in the litigation to amend their 
complaints. It is also possible that there is information flow that 
doesn't rise to the level of copying but still represents some sort of 
"free riding" on the patentee's product,141 though the incentives of 
plaintiffs to argue copying when they can should mean that most such 
cases get included within the broad definition of copying that we use. 
The specific fact situations we associate with copying are similarly 
both under- and over-inclusive; not every case of a departing 
employee or a business deal gone bad will involve copying, and not 
every case of copying will involve one of those facts. 
Data based on actual litigation of willfulness in written decisions 
reflects a different set of biases; it solves the undercounting and 
mistaken allegations problems with complaints, but it overcounts 
bench as opposed to jury trials, since the former are more likely to 
result in a written opinion, and it may be subject to selection bias if 
obvious cases of copying are disproportionately likely to settle before 
resolution. Finally, willfulness cases standing alone are likely to 
significantly overstate the percentage of copying, because both the 
fact that the plaintiff won the infringement suit and the fact that the 
plaintiff has alleged willful infringement are likely to be correlated 
with an artificially high level of copying. 
If each of these measures produced significantly different results, 
we might conclude that those results reflected imperfections in the 
proxies we used for copying. But the fact that all these diverse 
methodologies produce largely consistent results (as summarized in 
Table 4) gives us substantial confidence that copying is indeed rare in 
patent litigation. 
141. We thank Ted Sichelman for this point. 
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Table 4: Summary of Findings of Copying Across Measures 
Measure Total Cases Copying Percentage 
Complaints 193 21 10.9 
(Pharma) 20 13 65.0 
(Non-pharma) 173 8 4.2 
Decisions 
Allegations 1871 129 6.9 
(Pharma) 78 78 100 
(Non-pharma) 1793 51 2.8 
Findings 1871 33 1.8 
(Pharma) 78 22 28.2 
(Non-pharma) 1793 11 0.6 
Willfulness 
Allegations 226 40 17.7 
Findings 77 8 10.4 
So does the fact that the cases that end up involving copying 
almost all involved allegations of copying in the complaints. That 
doesn't mean we have captured every instance of copying; doubtless 
there are some we missed, perhaps because the plaintiffs themselves 
missed them. But it does suggest that the numbers we report are, 
while not perfect, pretty good approximations of the level of copying 
in the real world. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA 
A. Understanding Policy Debates and Reform Proposals 
The rarity of copying in modern patent law has several 
implications for understanding current rhetorical debates, public 
policy discussions, and proposals for reform. 
First, it should be evident that patent infringement can rarely, if 
ever, be equated with "theft" of physical property or even "piracy" of 
other types of IP. Public policy debates around patent reform often 
involve claims that any weakening of the patent right will destroy the 
patent system by encouraging widespread "theft" of patent rights. 142 
142. See, e.g., Edward M. Roche, Internet and Computer Related Crime: Economic and 
Other Harms to Organizational Entities, 76 MISS. L.J. 639, 644 (2007) (referring to the 
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But our data suggest that there is very little "theft" of patent rights 
going on right now-at least as it is represented in patent cases. 
Virtually every case filed-and even the overwhelming majority of 
those in which the plaintiffs win and claim that the defendant was a 
willful infringer-involve not theft or even copying with a legitimate 
effort to design around but independent development by the 
defendant. That doesn't mean that those defendants are not 
infringing, or that they shouldn't be held liable. Nor does it resolve 
the underlying debates over patent reform; just because no one is 
copying patented inventions now doesn't mean they wouldn't do so 
under a different legal regime. But it is simply inaccurate to speak of 
patent defendants as a whole as "unscrupulous copyists" or 
"thieves. "143 
The second implication for existing policy debates flows from the 
exception to what we just said. There are a few industries in which 
the defendants do in fact copy the invention from the plaintiffs-the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries. In those industries, the 
majority of cases involve allegations of copying. Indeed, in the 
pharmaceutical industry most patent infringement suits are filed 
against generic companies that file an ANDA application with the 
FDA in which they effectively admit that they have copied the 
plaintiff's drug (though not necessarily the plaintiff's patent) in order 
to show bioequivalence between the two products. 
The contrast between the pharmaceutical industry and the rest of 
the patent world, and particularly the information technology 
industries, will be a familiar one to those who have been following the 
years-long debate over patent reform. On issue after issue, the 
biopharmaceutical and the IT industries have lined up on opposite 
sides of the debate, effectively stifling legislative patent reform. Dan 
Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that this split results from 
"stealing of patents"); Christine Hlavka, Note, Contractor Patent Bandits: Preventing the 
Government from Avoiding 28 U.S. C. § 1498 Liability for Its Contractors' Unauthorized 
Use of Patented Material by Outsourcing One or More Steps of the Process Abroad, 37 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 322-29 (2008) (calling infringers "patent bandits"); Marian Uhlman, 
Pushinf{ Druf{ Patents, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 1993, at Dl (quoting patent owners 
referring to "patent pirates," comparing them to termites, and analogizing infringement to 
stealing a car). 
143. But see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) 
(implying otherwise). 
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fundamentally different industry characteristics.144 Our data provides 
a significant new piece of evidence to support that view. The IT 
industries, which faced a majority of the lawsuits in our samples, were 
virtually never accused of actually copying their products from the 
patent owner. Their perspective on strong patent enforcement rules 
will accordingly be quite different than that of companies in an 
industry in which copying is the norm in infringement suits. 
Finally, our data shed some light on the growing chorus of calls 
for an independent development defense, which currently does not 
exist in the United States.145 A number of scholars have argued that 
patent law should exempt independent development and instead 
target only copying, just as copyright and trade secret law do.146 One 
of us has expressed some skepticism over that proposai.I47 Our data 
demonstrates precisely how much is at stake in this debate. A patent 
infringement system that punished only copying would look 
dramatically different than current law. Ninety percent of patent 
lawsuits would go away, and most patent litigation would be in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Some will suggest this would 
be a good idea.148 We express no opinion on that issue here, other 
144. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 4-5, 92 (2009). 
145. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
146. See, e.g., Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 535; Carl Shapiro, Prior User 
Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 92; Vermont, supra note 72, at 484; John S. 
Liebovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2286-87 
(2002). Others have suggested that inadvertent infringers should pay only compensatory 
damages, not face injunctive relief. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1818-19 (2007) (noting that if 
"the problem of good-faith 'encroachment' became serious enough in patent law, a limited 
good-faith user defense with damages rather than injunctive remedies would be 
appropriate." But as Mike Carrier has observed, such a rule would effectively end 
injunctive relief in the overwhelming majority of patent cases, something Smith would 
likely oppose. See Michael A. Carrier, Why Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) 
Explain Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 95, 99 (2007), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/592.pdf ("Smith does not explain how his enthusiasm 
for injunctions addresses these problems, makes sense in light of reasonable patent trends 
moving in the other direction, or is consistent with his preference for a damages remedy 
for inadvertent infringers."). 
147. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (setting forth the specific critique of 
such a defense). 
148. Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer, for example, present data suggesting that the patent 
system is only working in those industries. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, 
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LA WYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT 
RISK 15 (2008). 
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than to point out precisely how different such a patent system would 
be from the one we have today. 
B. Calibrating Patent Damages 
Our findings bear on one significant set of judicial and policy 
debates-those over the appropriate measure of damages in patent 
infringement cases. Unlike copyright and trade secret law, which 
provide that prevailing plaintiffs can recover not only for their own 
losses but also the defendant's gains, 149 and in some cases far more 
than that,150 patent law since at least 1946 has limited the award of 
damages to those adequate to compensate the plaintiff for its losses.151 
Compensatory patent damages take one of two forms-lost profits, if 
the plaintiff can prove she lost profits, and a reasonable royalty in all 
other cases.152 
In recent years, courts have awarded greater and greater 
damages under the reasonable royalty theory, in part because they 
have ignored mechanisms designed to avoid overcompensation in 
complex industries153 but in part also because they were influenced by 
the perceived need to deter infringement. In Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling, 154 for example, the court affirmed an award of 
"reasonable" royalties more than six times the actual royalty charged 
for use of patented seeds, in part to avoid a "windfall" to the infringer 
and in part because "of the savings Mr. McFarling achieved by his 
infringement, the benefits to Monsanto from requiring farmers to 
adhere to the terms of its standard licensing agreement, and the 
benefits conferred by the patented technology over the use of 
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2006); UNIF. TRADESECRETSAcr § 3(a). 
150. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (providing for statutory damages that can exceed actual 
damages by a factor of thousands in extreme cases). 
151. 35 U.S. C.§ 284 was amended in 1946 to eliminate the disgorgement remedy. 
152. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 
1978) ("When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner is 
entitled to a reasonable royalty."). 
153. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits From Reasonable Royalties, 
50 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6-13), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133173#; Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2020-25 (2007); Brian 
1. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 263, 277 (2007). 
154. 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007). One of the authors represented McFarling in this 
case. 
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conventional seeds." 155 In so doing, the court imported the concept of 
unjust enrichment into the damages calculation. And in other cases 
the Federal Circuit has similarly granted reasonable royalty awards 
that significantly exceed the amount required to compensate patent 
owners. 156 At least in part, those decisions, too, have done so to deter 
patent infringement, as in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph.157 But even where 
deterrence is not an explicit rationale, the court seems increasingly to 
consider the profit the defendant makes from infringement to be fair 
game in the reasonable royalty calculus, as in McFarling and 
Golight. 158 
Our data suggest that the incorporation of unjust enrichment and 
deterrence concepts into reasonable royalty law is a mistake. With 
very few exceptions, defendants are not making a calculated decision 
to infringe a patent. The overwhelming majority of defendants are 
independent developers who were unaware of the existence of the 
patent when they made their product design decisions. And those 
who were aware of the patent and made a decision to infringe are 
mostly generic pharmaceutical companies subject to a special set of 
rules that make the application of reasonable royalty law implausible 
in the extreme.159 Less than 4% of complaints in our database even 
155. /d. at 980--81 (emphasis added). 
156. See Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (approving a 
royalty which far exceeded the defendant's profit from infringement); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding a reasonable royalty 
that exceeded the infringer's profits from the product). For a discussion of this issue, see, 
for example, Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New 
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 323-66 (2006). 
157. 382 F.3d at 1384. To be sure, there was substantial reason to believe that Ralph 
was a bad actor. For a discussion of the role of intent in damages theory, see, for example, 
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 1, 5--44 (2001), and Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A 
Transactional Model, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1165, 1185-87 (2008). 
158. Some scholars have expressly argued for this approach, suggesting that because an 
"option to infringe" is valuable to the defendant, that value needs to be conveyed to the 
patentee. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial 
Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 830--31 (2007). 
159. In pharmaceutical patent cases, the generic must notify the patentee before selling 
a generic product, and the patentee is entitled to an automatic thirty-month stay of those 
sales pending its infringement suit. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355U)(5)(B)(iii)(IV) (West Supp. 2008); 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). If that thirty-month period expires, courts can enter preliminary 
injunctions, and, even if they don't, generic companies are often afraid to enter the market 
"at risk." As a result, most pharmaceutical patent cases never involve claims of damages 
at all. And if they do, those damages will almost certainly be the patent owner's lost 
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involve allegations of copying that might justify a deterrence-related 
"kicker"160 of the sort that is increasingly showing up in Federal 
Circuit case law. For the same reason, the scholarship that suggests 
treating the "choice" to infringe as a real option for which the 
infringer should have to pay161 misses the point: overwhelmingly, 
infringers are not choosing to infringe, but are designing products in 
ignorance of the patent in ways that are later found to infringe. 162 
We aren't suggesting that damages aren't appropriate for patent 
infringement-far from it. But deterrence and unjust enrichment are 
concepts designed to punish and therefore discourage infringement; 
they have no place in a patent regime where virtually all infringement 
is unintentional. 
In the rare cases where infringement is intentional, patent law 
provides for treble damages for willful infringement.163 A second 
finding in our data, though, is that "willfulness" as the term is used in 
patent law bears little resemblance to intentional copying. To begin, 
we note that 157 of 193 plaintiffs (81.3%) in our complaint database 
alleged willfulness even though only 21 alleged copying-establishing 
no statistically significant relationship between allegations of 
willfulness and copying. 164 And while we did find a statistically 
significant relationship between these two allegations in the opinion 
profits, not a reasonable royalty, since by hypothesis the generic has copied a drug the 
patent owner is currently selling on the market, depriving that patent owner of a sale. 
160. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978), 
established the concept of a "kicker" to account for otherwise-uncompensated losses. /d. 
at 1158-59. The Federal Circuit rejected the kicker idea in Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard Co., 79 
F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that no "kicker" is permissible on top of the 
reasonable royalty to compensate for attorney's fees or litigation expenses; patentee must 
prove case is exceptional to recover such expenses), but has reimported it under other 
names. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(permitting "[d]iscretionary increases"); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (allowing for "an increase in the reasonable royalty determined by the 
court"). 
161. See Hausman et al., supra note 158; J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, 
and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 
736-41 (2008). 
162. To be sure, one could envision a market in which patents were easy to identify, 
interpret, and license, and in such a hypothetical world it might make sense to require all 
companies to search for and license patents before beginning any research or production 
product. But we do not live in that world. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19 (2008). 
163. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane). 
164. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (finding a p-value of 0.7077). 
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dataset, 165 the percentage of cases where there was such a correlation 
was still very low (17.70% ). The percentage stayed low when looking 
at cases where willfulness was actually decided, with only 20 (25.97%) 
of the cases deciding the willfulness issue mentioning an allegation of 
copying. And when willfulness was found, an allegation or finding of 
copying did not necessarily follow. In the 42 cases finding willful 
infringement, only 11 (26.19%) contained an allegation of copying 
and only 7 (16.67%) found copying.166 In fact, two cases found willful 
infringement while explicitly finding no copying.167 
This data suggests a mismatch between the goals of willfulness 
law-to deter intentional conduct-and its application in the courts. 
The Federal Circuit changed the standard for willfulness in 2007 and 
now requires proof of "objective recklessness"168-a standard still less 
than intentional conduct but more stringent than the duty of due care 
that preceded it. It remains to be seen whether this new standard will 
bring claims of willfulness more in line with the subset of cases 
involving claims of intentional conduct. 
C. Patents, Disclosure, and Technology Transfer 
Our data may also shed some light on the role of the patent 
system in encouraging technology transfer. The patent cases we 
studied were not, by and large, cases about a defendant learning the 
invention from the plaintiff. That doesn't mean that technology 
transfer from patentees to others-or even copying of inventions-
doesn't happen in the patent system, of course. We expect that 
patent licensing involves technology transfer (as opposed to merely 
an agreement to forebear from suit) in a wide variety of contexts, 
from university licenses to start-ups to joint ventures to international 
165. See supra note 134 and accompanying text {finding a p-value of< 0.0001). 
166. As a point of contrast, James Bessen and Michael Meurer found that 44% (30 of 
68) of cases finding willfulness included a finding of copying. See BESSEN & MEURER, 
supra note 148, at 277 n. 5. Bessen and Meurer's numbers come from a much older 
dataset-compiled in 2000 by now Judge Kimberly Moore. Id. 
167. Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 WL 
2790777, at *4-6 {W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2007) (choosing not to enhance damages even 
though willful infringement was found); Floe Intern., Inc. v. Newmans' Mfg. Inc., No. 04-
5120(DWF/RLE), 2006 WL 2472112, at *2, 6 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2006) (choosing to 
enhance damages). 
168. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
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outsourcing of production.169 But it does suggest that patent litigation 
today is not about policing failed efforts at technology transfer, but 
rather about efforts by patent owners to enforce their right of 
exclusivity or to collect revenue from independent creators. As a 
corollary, it may well be that judicial or legislative efforts to curb 
abuse of patent litigation will have no significant adverse effect on the 
technology transfer function of the patent system, though it is 
important to make sure that efforts to limit the very real problem of 
litigation abuse don't spill over into attacks on patent rights more 
generally. 
Our data do provide some inferential support for those who have 
argued that the disclosure function of the patent system isn't working 
terribly well. Most defendants in patent infringement lawsuits are not 
copiers-meaning they were not knowingly using already-patented 
technology as the basis for an improvement or attempting to design-
around a patented technology. This should not be surprising. A 
variety of evidence already suggests that scientists in most industries 
rarely read patents, and that even if they did, those patents aren't a 
particularly good means of conveying technical information.170 The 
fact that few, if any, people appear to be copying technology from 
patent owners is consistent with this argument, though it is not proof 
that people aren't copying inventions after the expiration of their 
patents, copying patents and then voluntarily paying licenses, or 
successfully designing-around. 
D. Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets 
Finally, our results have implications for the relationship 
between patents and trade secrets. The traditional approach to this 
relationship, both by courts and commentators, views inventors as 
choosing between patent and trade secret protection.171 In the 
traditional view, patents are superior to trade secrets because they 
169. See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 93-95 (2001) 
(investigating and documenting IP-related technology transfer); Joshua S. Gans eta!., The 
Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence From 
Patent Grant Delays (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13234, 2007), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3234.pdf (finding substantial licensing of 
technology even before a patent issues). 
170. Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560-62 (2009); Lemley, 
supra note 162, at 21-22. 
171. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Oil Co., 416 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1974); CRAIG 
NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 785-S6 (2008). 
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give the public the benefit of the invention, and so the law weakens 
trade secret protection sufficiently that users are inclined to choose 
patent protection instead.172 Similarly, in this view, if patent law is 
weakened too much, inventors will choose instead to rely on secrecy, 
and the public domain will be impoverished as a result. 
Our findings cast substantial doubt on this traditional story. 
Trade secret law punishes only misappropriation of one's ideas by 
another-that is, copying. Because patent plaintiffs are 
overwhelmingly suing to prevent independent development, trade 
secret law would not help them. Further, in the only class of cases 
where defendants are copying the plaintiff's invention with great 
regularity-pharmaceutical cases-the regulatory structure of the 
market will likely preclude reliance on trade secret law. As a result, 
patent litigants don't face much of a choice. No matter how much 
patent law is weakened, they are unlikely to switch to secrecy, 
because secrecy doesn't give them what they want from the patent 
system.173 
CONCLUSION 
Patents are fundamentally different from other types of IP rights. 
The patent litigation system does not appear to operate to prevent 
copying. Instead, it gives patent owners control primarily over 
independent invention by third parties. There may be good reasons 
to give patent owners this control, whether to give inventors extra 
incentives or perhaps to create more certain rights that more easily 
can be licensed. But debates over the patent system-and legal rules 
that set remedies for infringement-should not be based on the 
assumption that patent infringers are "thieves" or "copiers." The 
evidence we offer in that paper suggests that that assumption is 
wrong. 
172. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 489-90. For a discussion of the choices actually 
made by inventors, which are more complicated, see Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising 
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 338-41 (2009). 
173. There is, however, a question about an inventor's perception on the front-end. If 
the rhetoric of copying is as strong as it seems to be, there might be reason to believe that 
inventors think (wrongly, as our data establishes) that the value in the patent lies in 
keeping out potential copyists. Inventors may have the misperception that patent law's 
capturing of independent creation is only a marginal benefit. For those inventors with this 
perception, opting for trade secrecy is a real (if misguided) possibility. 
